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Abstract
In the Bitcoin system, miners are incentivized to join the system and validate
transactions through fees paid by the users. A simple “pay your bid” auction
has been employed to determine the transaction fees. Recently, Lavi, Sattath and
Zohar [8] proposed an alternative fee design, called the monopolistic price (MP)
mechanism, aimed at improving the revenue for the miners. Although MP is not
strictly incentive compatible (IC), they studied how close to IC the mechanism
is for iid distributions, and conjectured that it is nearly IC asymptotically based
on extensive simulations and some analysis. In this paper, we prove that the MP
mechanism is nearly incentive compatible for any iid distribution as the number of
users grows large. This holds true with respect to other attacks such as splitting
bids. We also prove a conjecture in [8] that MP dominates the RSOP auction in
revenue (originally defined in Goldberg et al. [5] for digital goods). These results
lend support to MP as a Bitcoin fee design candidate. Additionally, we explore
some possible intrinsic correlations between incentive compatibility and revenue in
general.
∗Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing.
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1 Introduction
Bitcoin, and more broadly blockchain systems, rely on the willingness of honest players
to participate in the system. A good blockchain system should have simple, practical
designs with suitable security guarantees against cheating. The incentive compatibility
(IC) concept which seeks to incentivize the participants to be truthful is playing an
increasingly central role in the design of distributed financial systems.
Recently, Lavi, Sattath and Zohar [8] started a study of the subject of Bitcoin Fee
Market design. In this market, there are two kinds of players: the users who have
transaction records that need to be certified and registered in the bitcoin system, and
the miners who create new blocks to include the transactions and get them certified.
Each user declares the maximal amount she is willing to pay for her transaction, and
the miners use a mechanism to decide which transactions to include and how much fee
to charge each user. A primary focus of their study is the Monopolistic Price (MP)
mechanism, which is a natural and practical mechanism, although not IC in the strict
sense (see Section 2 below). Their extensive simulations indicate that the mechanism
does not deviate too much from being IC for most iii distributions, as the number of
users n grows large. An analysis was given for the special case of discrete distributions
of finite size. They suggest that MP might be a good alternative to the “pay your bid”
auction, which is subject to low bids and revenue. It is posed as a conjecture that the
MP mechanism is nearly-IC for general iid distributions.
We will prove that MP is nearly-IC for any iid distribution as n grows large, thus
mathematically validating the strong simulation results obtained in [8]. Note that the
standard IC criterion (in auction market) only addresses one kind of attack, namely,
the reporting of an untruthful bid value. There are other possible attacks by Bitcoin
users: for example, in the multiple strategic bids (MSB) attack discussed in [8], a user
could gain advantage by splitting his transaction into several transactions and bidding
separately. This strategy could even enable a losing transaction to be included in the
block. We will also prove the nearly-IC conjecture for MP with respect to the MSB
attack.
We consider another mechanism, called the RSOP (Random Sampling Optimal
Price) auction, which was first defined by Goldberg et al. [5] in the digital goods context
and shown to be truthful. We prove that the RSOP revenue is always dominated by
the MP revenue, as conjectured in [8]. In fact, the revenue difference can be arbitrarily
large for some distributions, prompting us to look more deeply into possible correlation
between IC and revenue in general (Theorem 6-8).
The contributions of the present paper are two-fold. First, we prove the Monop-
olistic Price mechanism to be nearly-IC, confirming the previous strong experimental
data. This holds true against the MSB attack as well. We also show MP to dominate
the RSOP auction in revenue. These results lend support to MP as a Bitcoin fee de-
sign candidate. Secondly, the methodology used in our proofs involves sophisticated
mathematical analysis. It demonstrates that theoretical computer science can provide
powerful tools to complement system design for blockchains. Finally, we believe that
the emerging area of incentive compatible blockchain design is an exciting research area
with many intriguing problems to solve, for theorists and system designers alike.
Related Work: The basic model for Bitcoin fee market introduced in [8] in fact resembles
the maximum revenue problem for Digital Goods as considered by Goldberg et al. [4][5].
The MP mechanism is similar to the optimal omniscient auction in [5]. However, The
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Bitcoin fee market differs from digital goods in its additional features: such as the
auctioneer may delete or insert bids, or the users may split bids. This makes the Bitcoin
fee design a rich and relevant new research subject for auction theory and mechanism
design. Among those work closely related to the current subject include Babaioff et al.
[1], Kroll et al. [6], Carlsten et al. [3], Bonneau [2], Huberman et al. [7]. To formulate
meaningful incentive models, there is much research work in Bitcoin which provides
important ingredients for consideration. A more complete survey of related work can
be found in [8, Section 1.3].
2 Review of the Models and Known Results
We first review the Bitcoin fee model and several mechanisms defined and studied in
[8]. A miner acts as a monopolist who offers n users to include their transactions in
the miner’s next block for a fee. Each user i has one transaction that needs this service
and is willing to pay a fee up to some value vi. The miner’s problem is to design a
mechanism to extract good revenue. The standard Bitcoin mechanism in use is a pay-
your-bid system, where the miner simply takes the highest bids to fill the capacity of
the block. This mechanism may not receive good revenue, since some bidders may not
reveal the true value of the fees they are willing to pay. In view of this, some alternative
mechanisms are proposed in [8] and their security properties considered, which we will
review below.
2.1 The Monopolistic Price (MP) Mechanism
Suppose user i bids vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Sort v1, · · · , vn into a decreasing sequence
b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn. Define the monopolistic price as R(v) = maxk∈[n] k · bk. Denote
by k∗(v) the k maximizing R(v) (in case of ties, k∗ is taken to be the maximal one).
The miner will include all users with the highest bids b1, b2, · · · bk∗(v) and simply charge
each one of them the same fee bk∗(v). Call this the monopolistic price p
mono(v) = bk∗(v).
This mechanism gives the miner revenue R(v), which is obviously the maximum revenue
obtainable if all accepted bids must be charged a single price.
The above MPMechanism is not truthful. [8] analyzed how serious the non-truthfulness
can be; we review their results below.
Consider any user i and the vector of bids v−i = (v1, · · · , vi−1, vi+1, · · · vn) of the
other users. Let
phonest(vi, v−i) = pmono(vi, v−i), and
pstrategic(v−i) = min{bi ∈ R |pmono(vi, v−i) ≤ vi}.
To measure how much temptation there is for the users to shade their bids, define the
discount ratio δi for user i:
δi(vi, v−i) =
{
1− pstrategic(v−i)
phonest(vi, v−i)
if vi ≥ pstrategic(v−i),
0 otherwise.
This ratio captures the gain a user can obtain by bidding strategically (instead of truth-
fully).
A major theme of [8] is to investigate how large the discount ratio will typically
be. Assume all true values vi are drawn iid from some distribution F on [0,∞). Two
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measures are defined: the worst-case measure and the average case one. For the former,
let
δmax(v) = max
i
δi(vi, v−i),
∆maxn = E(v1,··· ,vn)∼F [δmax(v)].
For the latter, let
∆averagen = E(v1,··· ,vn)∼F [δ1(v1, v−1)].
Clearly, for every F and n, we have ∆maxn ≥ ∆averagen , since δmax(v) ≥ δi(vi, v−i) for any
v.
An analysis was given in [8] for the special case of discrete distributions of finite size.
Theorem A [8, Theorem 2.3]
For any distribution F with a finite support size, limn→∞∆maxn (F ) = 0. (This implies
also limn→∞∆
average
n (F ) = 0 for such F .)
Based on extensive simulations done for a variety of distributions, the authors made
the following conjecture that MP is nearly IC for general iid distributions as n gets large.
Nearly IC Conjecture for MP [8, Conjecture 2.5]
1. For any distribution F , limn→∞∆
average
n (F ) = 0. Specifically ∆
average
n (F ) = O(
1
n
).
2. If F has a bounded support, limn→∞∆maxn (F ) = 0. Specifically ∆maxn (F ) = O(
1
n
).
3. There exists a distribution F with an unbounded support such that limn→∞∆maxn (F ) >
0.
In the O-notation above, the constants may depend on F . Part of the basis for
their conjecture 3 is the Inverse distribution F where PrF {X > x} = 1x (for x ∈
[1,∞)). Experimentally, it appears that for this F , limn→∞∆averagen (F ) = 0, while
limn→∞∆maxn (F ) > 0.
The main purpose of our paper is to settle the Nearly IC Conjecture for MP in the
positive.
Multiple Strategic Bids (MSB) Attack
It was shown in [8] that a user could gain advantage by splitting his bid into several
transactions with separate bids. This strategy could even enable a losing transaction to
be included in the block. Let
pmulti(v−i) = min
{
u · v(u)i | v(1)i ≥ · · · ≥ v(u)i ≥ pmono(v(1)i , · · · , v(u)i , v−i)
}
,
δi(vi, v−i) =
{
1− pmulti(v−i)
phonest(vi, v−i)
if vi ≥ pmulti(v−i),
0 otherwise.
It is conjectured that the Nearly-IC Conjecture holds even under this stronger attack.
We will show that this is indeed the case.
2.2 The Random Sampling Optimal Price (RSOP) Auction
We consider another mechanism, called the RSOP (Random Sampling Optimal Price)
auction, first defined by Goldberg et al. [5] in the digital goods context.
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Definition. [RSOP auction]
Upon receiving n bids v = (v1, · · · , vn), the auctioneer randomly partitions the bids into
two disjoint sets A and B, and computes the monopolistic price for each set: PmonoA ,
PmonoB (with the monopolistic price for an empty set being set to 0). Finally, the set of
winning bids is A′∪B′, where A′ = {i ∈ A : vi ≥ PmonoB } and B′ = {i ∈ B : vi ≥ PmonoA }.
The bidders in A′ each pays PmonoB , and the bidders in B
′ each pays PmonoA .
Note the revenue obtained in this auction is
RSOP (v) = |A′| · PmonoB + |B′| · PmonoA .
Theorem B (Goldberg et al. [5])
The RSOP auction is truthful. For any v = (v1, · · · , vn) with vi ∈ [1,D] (where D is a
constant) for all i, we have
lim
n→∞maxv
R(v)
RSOP (v)
= 1.
In [8], several variants of RSOP were examined and simulation carried out which led
to the following conjecture.
Dominance Conjecture of MP over RSOP [8, Conjecture 5.4]
For any v and all choices of A and B, the RSOP revenue is at most the monopolistic
price revenue. That is, RSOP (v) ≤ R(v).
The MP Dominance Conjecture has relevance to the robustness of RSOP against
adding false bids or deleting bids by the auctioneer (see discussions in [8]). In the
present paper we prove the MP Dominance Conjecture to be true.
3 Main Results
In this paper we settle the Nearly-IC Conjecture (even allowing for the MSB attack)
and the MP Dominance Conjecture mentioned above: the former in Theorem 1-4, and
the latter in Theorem 5. Additionally, we investigate the possible correlation between
incentive compatibility and revenue. In this regard, we demonstrate that distributions
with unbounded support can exhibit different characteristics from the bounded ones,
and these findings will be presented in Theorems 6-8.
3.1 Nearly Incentive Compatibility of MP
We prove that mechanism MP is nearly incentive compatible for large n in Theorems
1-3.
Theorem 1. For any distribution F on bounded support, limn→∞∆maxn (F ) = 0.
Theorem 2. For any distribution F , limn→∞∆
average
n (F ) = 0.
Remark 1. The proof in Theorem 1 can be refined to show that ∆maxn (F ) = O(
1
nβ
)
where β > 0 is a constant independent of F , while the constant in the O-notation is
F -dependent. Similarly, Theorem 2 can be strengthened to ∆averagen (F ) = O(
1
nβ
) when
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F satisfies supx x(1 − F (x)) < ∞. The analysis follows the same outline as the proofs
for Theorems 1, 2 above but the details are more complicated. They will be left for a
later version of the paper.
Recall that the distribution Inverse is defined as PrF {X > x} = 1x for x ∈ [1,∞).
Theorem 3. For F =Inverse, limn→∞∆maxn (F ) > c for all n, where c > 0 is some
absolute constant.
Theorem 4. With respect to the MSB attack, the Monopolistc Pricing Mechanism is
nearly incentive compatible, i.e., Theorems 1-2 are still valid.
3.2 The Effect of IC on Revenue
Theorem 5. For any v, RSOP (v) ≤ R(v).
Theorem B of Goldberg et al. [5] says that, RSOP yields asymptotically the same
revenue as the monopolistic price mechanism when the distribution F has a bounded
support [1,D]. We point out that this is not always true when F has infinite support.
Theorem 6. For F =Inverse,
lim
n→∞
1
n
Ev1,··· ,vn∼F [R(v)] =∞, while
lim
n→∞
1
n
Ev1,··· ,vn∼F [RSOP (v)] = 1.
Let rF = supx x(1 − F (x). For example, rF = 1 for F = Inverse. A key difference
between RSOP and the monopolistic price mechanism is that, the former is incentive
compatible (and thus cannot extract revenue more than rFn), while the latter is not
incentive compatible.
Suppose we are given F = Inverse as value distribution. Theorem 6 above shows
that Monopolistic Price can extract an unbounded revenue in this case. Is the property
derived in Theorem 3 limn→∞∆maxn (F ) > c in fact a necessary condition for all such
mechanisms? The following theorem shows that the answer is more complex.
For any mechanism M and bid vector v, let M(v) be the revenue collected.
Theorem 7. Let F = Inverse.
(a) There exists a mechanism M such that limn→∞∆maxn (F ) = 0 and
lim
n→∞
1
n
Ev1,··· ,vn∼F [M(v)] =∞.
(b) Let η < 1 be any fixed constant. Any mechanism M such that δmax(v) < η for all v
must satisfy
lim
n→∞
1
n
Ev1,··· ,vn∼F [M(v)] <∞.
Note that δmax and ∆
max
n are not the only ways to quantify a mechanism’s closeness
to being incentive compatible. Two standard ways to define being ǫ-close to IC (or more
generally, to Nash equilibrium) are
(1) Additively ǫ-close: p(vi, v−i)− pmonoi (v−i) ≤ ǫ, or
(2) Multiplicatively ǫ-close: p(vi, v−i)− pmonoi (v−i) ≤ ǫ(vi − p(vi, v−i)).
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We will show that, adopting the “multiplicatively ǫ-close” definition, one can obtain
nearly IC mechanisms that derive infinite revenue under the distribution F = Inverse.
This is in contrast to the previous discount model defined in terms of δmax.
Let M be any IC mechanism (such as RSOP). For any bid vector v, let pi(v) be
the fee paid by user i (if i is a winner), and ui(v) = vi − pi(v) be the utility. For any
0 ≤ ǫ < 1, let Mǫ be the mechanism that uses the same allocation rule as M , with the
fee modified to be p′i(v) = pi(v) +
ǫ
1+ǫ ui(v). The following theorem is easy to prove.
Theorem 8.
(a) Mǫ is multiplicatively ǫ-close to IC;
(b)
lim
n→∞
1
n
Ev∼F [Mǫ(v)] = lim
n→∞
1
n
Ev∼F [M(v)] +
ǫ
1 + ǫ
lim
n→∞
1
n
Ev∼F (
∑
i
ui(v)).
Theorem 8 implies that RSOP can be easily modified to become a multiplicatively ǫ-
close-to-IC mechanism such that, like MP, its revenue is infinite under F = Inverse.
We will prove Theorems 1-3, 5 in the following sections. The proof for the Multiple
Strategic Bids model of Theorem 4 is similar in essence to the basic model, and hence
will be omitted. We also leave out the proofs of Theorem 6-8.
4 An Overview of the Proof for Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is the most difficult to prove. In this section we give some intuition and an
overview of the proof.
Let F be a distribution over [0,D]. Let v1, · · · , vn be generated according to iid
F , and denote by b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn the sorted list of the v′is. By Claim A9 in [8],
δmax(b) = δ1(b1, b−1), i.e. the maximum discount ratio is achieved by the user with the
highest bid. This leads immediately to a necessary condition on w, the optimal strategic
bid by the highest bidder, as we state below.
Lemma 1. [Optimal Strategic Bid (OSB) Condition]
Let k∗ = k∗(b). If δmax(b) ≥ η, where 0 < η ≤ 1, then there exists w ∈ [0, (1 − η)bk∗ ]
such that iw · w ≥ k∗ · bk∗ −D, where iw is defined by biw ≥ w > biw+1.
Lemma 1 states that, in order to have a sizable η, there has to exist a w some
distance away from bk∗ such that iw · w is only a constant D smaller than the sampled
maximum R(b) = k∗ · bk∗. We will prove Theorem 1 by showing that a random b is
stochastically unlikely to satisfy the OSB necessary condition.
As a start, we prove Theorem 1 when the distribution F has a unique α0 > 0
where A = supα α(1 − F (α)) is achieved. The law of large number implies that, for
large n, every w ≤ α0(1 − 12η) satisfies iw · w < (A − ρ)n (where ρ is some fixed
constant) with overwhelming probability. Coupled with the fact bk∗ − α0 = O( 1√n) and
k∗ · bk∗ = A · n + O(
√
n) probabilistically, we see that the OSB condition in Lemma 1
cannot hold. Hence we have shown Theorem 1 for the case when supα α(1 − F (α)) has
a maximum achieved at a unique point α = α0.
The above argument does not apply when supα α(1−F (α)) achieves maximum value
at multiple points. As an extreme case, consider the Inverse distribution modified as
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follows:
Inv(D)(x) =
{
1− 1
x
for 1 ≤ x < D,
1 for x = D.
In this case, x(1− Inv(D)(x)) = 1 for all 1 ≤ x < D.
Hence the challenge is to prove that, even for extreme cases like the above, the OSB
condition in Lemma 1 cannot be met except with vanishingly small probability. At
the top level, we wish to show that, in any two subintervals I, J ⊆ [0,D] separated
by a non-negligible distance, the maximum values AI = max{j · bj |bj ∈ I} and AJ =
max{j · bj |bj ∈ J} cannot achieve perfect correlation to allow |AI −AJ | = O(1) except
with negligible probability for large n. This claim takes a non-trivial proof since intervals
AI and AJ , being taken from the sorted version b of v, are correlated to a certain degree.
Before proving Theorem 1, we first recast Lemma 1 in an new form which does not
reference the quantity w. The main advantage of Lemma 1A is that, the condition now
refers only to the quantities b1, · · · , bn, thus making it easier to analyze how likely the
condition can be satisfied stochastically.
Lemma 1A. [Optimal Strategic Bid (OSB) Condition]
Let k∗ = k∗(b) and 0 < η < 1. If δmax(b) ≥ η, then there exists bj ∈ [0, bk∗(1 − 12η)]
such that j · bj ≥ k∗ · bk∗ − 2D2η·bk∗ .
Proof. Take the w as specified in Lemma 1. The following constraints are satisfied:
write i = iw and B = k
∗ · bk∗ , then
bk∗ − η · bk∗ ≥ w, (1)
i · w ≥ B −D. (2)
Let ∆j = bk∗ − bj for j ∈ {i, i + 1}. Let 0 ≤ λ < 1 such that w = λbi + λ′bi+1 where
λ′ = 1− λ. It is easy to verify from Eq. (1), (2) that
λ∆i + λ
′∆i+1 ≥ η · bk∗, (3)
λ(i · bi) + λ′ ((i+ 1)bi+1) ≥ B −D. (4)
Note that Eq. (4) implies
max{i · bi, (i+ 1)bi+1} ≥ B −D. (5)
We now prove Lemma 1A.
Case 1. If ∆i >
1
2η · bk∗ , then choose j ∈ {i, i+ 1} depending on which gives the larger
j · bj . This j satisfies Lemma 1A, as a consequence of Eq. (1) and (5).
Case 2. ∆i ≤ 12η · bk∗ . Eq. (3) implies λ′D ≥ 12η · bk∗, and thus
λ′ ≥ η · bk∗
2D
. (6)
From Eq. (4) and the fact i · bi ≤ B, we have
λ′ ((i+ 1)bi+1) ≥ λ′B −D.
Using Eq. (6), we obtin
(i+ 1)bi+1 ≥ B − 2D
2
η · bk∗ .
Taking j = i+ 1 satisfies Lemma 1A.
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5 Proof of Theorem 1
For simplicity of presentation, we assume that F has support [1,D]. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that F (x) < F (D) = 1 for any x < D. Some additional
arguments are needed for the general case [0,D]; we omit them here.
We will demonstrate that for a random b, the condition stated in Lemma 1A occurs
with probability at most O( (logn)
2
√
n
). That is, stochastically, the pair (bj , bk∗) with the
stated property rarely exists. First some notation. Let HF (x) = Prz∼F{z ≥ x} =
1−F (x−). To start the proof, we pick a point D1 ∈ [1,D] with the following properties:
P1: (D1,D] is a forbidden zone for bk∗ . Precisely, for a random b, the probability of
bk∗ ∈ (D1,D] is e−Ω(n).
P2: Prx∼F{x ∈ [D1,D]} > 0.
Fact 1 D1 exists.
Proof. Let αmax be the maximal α achieving supα{α ·HF (α)}.
Case 1. If αmax = D, then (D1,D] is empty and Prx∼F{x ∈ [D1,D]} = D ·HF (D) > 0.
Case 2. If αmax < D, then choose any D1 ∈ (αmax,D). Choose ∆ = 12(D1 − αmax).
Then for large n, the probability of bk∗ ∈ [0, αmax+∆] is 1− e−Ω(n), satisfying P1. We
also have Prx∼F{x ∈ [D1,D]} ≥ 1− F (D1) > 0, thus satisfying P2.
Divide [1,D1] into disjoint intervals of length ǫ, that is, write [1,D1] = ∪mℓ=1Iℓ where
Iℓ = [1+(ℓ−1)ǫ, 1+ ℓǫ) for 1 ≤ ℓ < m, and Im = [1+(m−1)ǫ, 1+mǫ]. Take a random
b, which is the sorted list of iid v1, · · · , vn ∼ F . Let Amaxℓ denote the random variable
max{i · bi| bi ∈ Iℓ}. Let Amax>ℓ be the random variable max{i · bi | bi ∈ Iℓ+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Im}.
Let Wℓ denote the event that
Amax>(ℓ+1) −
D2
ǫ
≤ Amaxℓ ≤ Amax>(ℓ+1).
Now note that, for δmax(b) > 2ǫ, the OSB condition for (Bj , bk∗) in Lemma 1A can hold
only if either 1) bj ∈ Iℓ and bk∗ ∈ Iℓ+2 ∪ · · · ∪ Im for some ℓ, or 2) bk∗ ∈ (D1,D].
Lemma 2. Pr{δmax(b) > 2ǫ} ≤
∑m−2
ℓ=1 Pr{Wℓ}+ e−Ω(n).
Proof. Immediate from property P1 and Lemma 1A.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the following lemma, which indicates
that Amaxℓ and A
max
>(ℓ+1) are not correlated to be nearly identical.
Lemma 3. [Weak Correlation Lemma] For each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m−2, Pr{Wℓ} = O( (logn)
2
√
n
).
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. Prx∼F{x ∈ Iℓ+1} > 0;
Case 2. Prx∼F{x ∈ Iℓ+1} = 0.
We give the proof of Case 1. The proof for Case 2 uses the same general idea, and
will only be sketched with details omitted here. Assume we have Case 1. Let G be the
distribution (normalized) when F is restricted to the interval L ≡ Iℓ+1 ∪ Iℓ+2 ∪ · · · ∪
Im ∪ [D1,D]. Let
ρ0 = Prx∼G{x ∈ Iℓ+1} > 0, and
ρ1 = Prx∼G{x ∈ [D1,D]} > 0.
9
Consider the generation of a random b in the following alternative (but equivalent) way.
Phase 1. Generate a random integer N so that
Pr{N = s} =
(
n
s
)
qs(1− q)n−s
for 0 ≤ s ≤ n, where q = Prx∼F{x ∈ L}.
Phase 2. Generate n−N iid random numbers v1, · · · , vN−n ∼ F |I1∪···∪Iℓ, and sort them
into decreasing order bN+1, bN+2, · · · , bn. (Note that Amaxℓ is already determined after
the completion of Phase 2.)
Phase 3. Generate v1, v2, · · · , vN ∼ G one number at a time. After step t, we sort the
numbers v1, v2, · · · , vt into decreasing order b(t)1 ≥ b(t)2 ≥ · · · ≥ b(t)t . Let
A(t) = max{i · b(t)i | b(t)i ∈ Iℓ+2 ∪ Iℓ+3 ∪ · · · ∪ Im}.
At time t = N , A(N) is exactly the same random variable as Amax
>(ℓ+1).
We prove two facts below, from which Lemma 3 follows immediately.
Fact 2 In Phase 1, N ≥ 12 q n with probability 1− e−Ω(n).
Proof. Chernoff’s bound.
After Phase 1 and 2, we have N and K = Amaxℓ decided. To prove Lemma 3 we only
need to show that, in Phase 3, there is enough randomness so that A(N) is unlikely to
have a value within an additive constant D
2
ǫ
to K.
Let us examine the evolution of A(t) as a random process of infinite length. The
random sequence A(t) satisfies A(0) = 0, and
A(t)


= A(t−1) with probability ρ0,
≥ A(t−1) + 1 with probability ρ1,
≥ A(t−1) otherwise,
for t ≥ 1.
Fact 3 At t = N , we have
Pr{|A(N) −K| < D
2
ǫ
} = O((logN)
2
√
N
) = O(
(log n)2√
n
).
Proof. (Sketch). Let s be the total number of times in the above process when either
the second or third selection is made by A(t), for 1 ≤ t ≤ N . Let A(t1), A(t2), · · · , A(ts)
be the projected sequence. Note E(s) = (1 − ρ0)N , V ar(s) = Θ(N), and in fact
Pr{s = u} = O( 1√
N
) for any u. Relabel A(ti) as B(i), and consider the random sequence
B(1), B(2), · · · . Let B(i), B(i+1), · · · , B(i′) be the portion of the sequence in the range
[K − D2
ǫ
, K + D
2
ǫ
]. It is easy to verify that, for the random sequence B(1), B(2), · · · ,
P r{i′ − i+ 1 ≥ D
2
ǫ
(logN)2} = O(N− logN ). (7)
To see this, note that there is at least a constant φ = ρ11−ρ0 probability to increase the
next B(j) value by 1 (or more). Thus, to increase the value by D
2
ǫ
, it takes only D
2
ǫ
1
φ
steps on average, rarely requiring a (logN)2 factor more steps.
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As Pr{s = u} = O( 1√
N
) for any u, we conclude that Pr{B(s) ∈ [K− D2
ǫ
, K+ D
2
ǫ
]} ≤
O( (log n)
2
√
n
). This completes the proof of Case 1.
In Case 2, Prx∼F{x ∈ Iℓ+1} = 0. We have lost the source of randomness critical
for the above argument since ρ0 = 0. Yet the source of randomness can be obtained by
splitting Iℓ into I
′
ℓ ∪ I
′′
ℓ suitably, so that I
′′
ℓ does not contain any bj with j · bj anywhere
close to the level of Amax
>(ℓ+1). (This will rely critically on the fact Prx∼F{x ∈ Iℓ+1} = 0.)
We omit here the details of implementing this plan, as well as the necessary handling of
discontinuities in distribution F . This finishes the proof of Lemma 3 and thus Theorem
1. .
6 Proof of Theorem 2
For any 1 > ǫ > 0, we show that
∆averagen (F ) ≤ ǫ (8)
for all sufficiently large n. First pick D > 0 such that F (D) > 1−ǫ/3. Take n iid vi ∼ F
and let qn,m be the probability of exactly m of the v
′
is falling into [0,D]. Let ǫ
′ = ǫ/2.
By the law of large numbers, there exists N1 such that for all n ≥ N1,∑
m≤(1−ǫ′)n
qn,m < ǫ/6. (9)
Consider the distribution G, obtained from restricting F to [0,D]. By Theorem 1, there
exists N2 > 0 such that
∆averagem (G) < ǫ/3 (10)
for all m > N2. We are now set for proving Theorem 2. By definition of ∆
average
n , we
have
∆averagen (F ) ≤
∑
m>(1−ǫ′)n
qn,m
[
m
n
∆averagem (G) +
n−m
n
]
+
∑
m≤(1−ǫ′)n
qn,m.
Using Eq. (9)-(10), we obtain for all n > max{N1, N2},
∆averagen (F ) ≤ (
ǫ
3
+ ǫ′) +
ǫ
6
= ǫ.
This proves Eq. (8) and Theorem 2.
7 Proof of Theorem 3
Consider n iid random variables v1, · · · , vn distributed according to the Inverse distri-
bution Inv, and let b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn be their sorted sequence. Let λ = 40, λ′ = 1, and
let Tn be the event (b1 > λn) ∧ (b2 < λ′n). Let Vn be the event (max2≤i≤n i · bi ≤ λn).
Theorem 3 is an immediate consequence of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4. If v satisfies event Tn ∧ Vn, then δmax(v) ≥ 1− λ′λ .
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Lemma 5.
Pr{Tn ∧ Vn} ≥ 1
λ
e−
2
λ′ − 4 e−λ2 .
.
Lemma 4 and 5 imply
∆maxn (Inverse) ≥ c,
where
c = (1− λ
′
λ
) ·
(
1
λ
e−
2
λ′ − 4 e−λ2
)
> 0.
This proves Theorem 3.
To prove Lemma 4, note that when Tn ∧Vn occurs, the highest bidder has a monop-
olistic price b1 and a strategic price less than λn. Thus for the highest bidder i, we have
δi(v) ≥ 1− λnb1 ≥ 1− λ
′
λ
. This proves Lemma 4.
Lemma 5 follows from the following facts:
Fact 4 Pr{Tn} ≥ 1λe−
2
λ′ .
Proof.
Pr{Tn} =
(
n
1
)
1
λn
(
1− 1
λ′n
)n−1
≥ 1
λ
e−
2
λ′ .
Fact 5 Pr{Vn|Tn} ≤ 2 e−λ2 .
Proof. Let y1, · · · , yn be iid distributed according to G, where for t ∈ [1, n],
Prz∼G{z > t} = 1
1− 1
n
(
1
t
− 1
n
).
Define Y maxn = max1≤i≤m{i·bi}, where b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn is the sorted sequence of y1, · · · , yn.
Clearly,
Pr{Vn|Tn} ≤ Pr{Y maxn ≥ λn}.
To prove Fact 5, it suffices to prove:
Pr{Y maxn ≥ λn} ≤ 2 e−
λ
2 . (11)
For any t ≥ 1, let Mt be the number of yi’s satisfying yi ≥ t, and Bt be the event that
t ·Mt ≥ λ2n. Let tk = 12kn for 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊log2 n⌋. As the event Y maxn ≥ λn implies∨1≤k≤⌊log2 n⌋Btk , we have
Pr{Y maxn ≥ λn} ≤
⌊log2 n⌋∑
i=1
Pr{Btk}. (12)
Observe that E(Mt) = (1− 1n)nt . Using Chernoff’s bound, we have
Pr{Bt} ≤ e−
λ
2
n
t . (13)
Equation (11) follows from (12) and (13) immediately. This completes the proof of Fact
5 and Theorem 3.
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8 Proof of Theorem 5
Without loss of generality, we assume that A, B are non-empty and that pmonoA ≤ pmonoB .
Let A consist of y1 ≥ · · · ≥ ym and B consist of z1 ≥ · · · ≥ zℓ, with ys = pmonoA and
zt = p
mono
B . Let A
′ = {y1, y2, · · · , ys′} and B′ = {z1, z2, · · · , zt′} be the winners from A
and B respectively. By definition of RSOP,
ys ≤ zt′ ,
t′zt′ ≤ t zt.
It follows that
RSOP (v) = t′ys + s′zt
≤ t′zt′ + s′zt
≤ t zt + s′zt.
Now by definition R(v) ≥ (t+ s′)zt. Theorem 5 follows.
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